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I.

Introduction
In the event that an accident occurs on the road, the standard response (once

ensuring the safety and well-being of the people involved) is to exchange insurance
details and confer with witnesses to determine a causal link that faults one, if not all
drivers involved. This system of assigning liability has been the historical standard, and is
actively followed today; but what about in the future? What if the cars involved in the
accident at hand are driverless cars – autonomous vehicles (AVs)? An account of the
accident can still be given, but it is now more difficult to determine fault – to whom do
we follow the causal link. Can we still apply our established liability principles in such an
autonomous world, and if so to which party? This study explores the question of liability
in an autonomous world, discussing potential frameworks of implementation to AV
accidents, and attempting to fill any gaps with our currently used liability system. The
paper will start by presenting the trolley problem as a sample of decision-making
scenarios that AVs may face; and will highlight the significant boost in road safety that is
a result of AV implementation. Section II aims to build an understanding of vehicle
autonomy, discussing the need for machine ethics and its requisite ethical conditions, as
well as the standard for autonomy in vehicles ; followed by the main discussion on
possible liability frameworks to be adopted.
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Trolley Problem
One of the most famous philosophical problems is the ethical dilemma faced in
the trolley problem. The trolley problem has been long discussed and debated and has
been slightly adapted in a number of ways, but remains unchanged in its fundamental
ethics. Introduced by Philippa Foot, the problem is as follows:

A trolley rounds a bend and is now progressing toward a portion of track that is
being maintained by five railway workers; who do not have any space around the track to
move to. The driver is unable to stop the trolley, which will surely collide with and kill
the five workers. You, a bystander, happen to be standing by a lever which will reroute
the trolley to a track on the right; however, that track has one railway worker on it, who
would be killed. Should you pull the lever to save the five, but kill the one? The answer
seems to vary among individuals, but there is a general consensus that no moral violation
occurs should you decide to pull the lever. Consideration of this ethical dilemma is
extended by a second scenario, usually introduced as a follow-up placing you on a bridge
with opportunity to throw a ‘fat man’ onto the tracks to derail the train and save the five
workers at the expense of the fat man. There seems to be greater consensus that pushing
the man would be morally impermissible, despite the higher number of deaths that occur
as a result. Using the two scenarios the trolley problem indicates that individuals’ moral
intuition and judgement varies even in scenarios that produce outcomes that risk, as well
as preserve the same number of lives.
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Although the consideration of AVs does not invoke the ‘problem’ that is differing
moral intuitions to a similar outcome, AVs will encounter scenarios such as the first half
of the trolley problem. The question of which path to take, and subsequently how much
damage to cause, must be answered in the moment by the AV. The AV’s capability to
provide an answer is in the hands of engineers and programmers participating in the
development and manufacture of the vehicle. The AV must make a decision on a course
of action – that is to kill five or one – to take based on the principled outcomes that are
programmed into it.

The programmers are removed from the direct personal responsibility that comes
with physically pulling the lever, but must face the decision of whether the lever is to be
pulled or not; since there must be some precaution in the event of inevitable damage,
even though AVs are poised to reduce road deaths. The process of producing a feasible
AV requires manufacturers to undertake morally significant decisions. This decision
making must be translated and programmed into the vehicle; and includes consideration
of the number of lives to save, as well as the sensitive decision of whether to prioritize
passenger safety more highly than the safety of non-passengers.

A study titled The social dilemma of autonomous vehicles, conducted by JeanFrancis Bonnefon, Azim Shariff, and Iyad Rahwan gathered information through six
online surveys. The social dilemma presented is similar to the trolley problem, except
that if the car saved five pedestrians, it would swerve and kill the passenger/driver. The
first survey asked participants to assess the morality of programming AVs to risk the
driver and passenger, and of the 182 participants, 76% believed it was moral to save ten
3

pedestrians for the sacrifice of one passenger. The second survey used a larger sample
size of 451 participants, asking for moral approval for a varying number of pedestrians
between one and a hundred. There seemed to be the belief that a single pedestrian should
be sacrificed, but moral approval for the driver-sacrifice programming increased with the
number of pedestrian lives put in danger; and grew to become consistent with the 76%
approval rate acquired in the first survey. Looking at image 1 below it is clear that
participants would prefer option C and even option A, to the unfavorable option B.

1

Ackerman, People Want Driverless Cars with Utilitarian Ethics, Unless They’re a Passenger.
See references
1

4

Participants seemed to prefer a utilitarian framework for the decision making system
inbuilt in the AV2, but deviated from this preference when presented with the decision to
preserve themselves or a loved one as a passenger – at the cost of non-passengers.

This variation in decision making amongst potential consumers of AVs suggests
that manufacturers will have great difficulty determining which moral intuitions are
programmed into the vehicle. The lack of clarity in determining an ideal moral
framework that enables vehicle decision making may provoke the question, why continue
producing AVs if we can’t identify the perfect set of morals? Although assessed from a
largely utilitarian standpoint, AV crash statistics suggest significant reductions in annual
road deaths, a decrease of about 30,000 deaths; and such significant improvement is
likely to be wholly supported by all road commuters as well as society as a whole. It is
rational to want further production and development of AVs given this information. The
following section illustrates the current trends of road accidents and the prospective
impact of the introduction of AVs.

Crash Statistics
Prior to further discussing liability concerns, it will be useful to take a look at
crash statistics to better understand the road accident climate in the United States. The
statistics presented first will not include any testing AVs currently active on roads. The
most recent reports available are for the year 2014 and are presented below:

2

Keep this in mind during the section on AI and machine ethics, as the importance of a utilitarian
foundation is established, suggesting that utilitarian concerns should not be discarded.
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In 2014 a total of 29,989 fatal crashes were reported, taking 32,675 lives; while an
additional 2,300,000 people were injured in vehicle crashes. Table 13 below provides
further insight into the distribution of these accidents.
Motorist

Non-motorist

Drivers

16,454

Pedestrians

4,884

Passengers

5,751

Pedal Cyclists

726

Unknown

71

Other/Unknown

203

The US Department of Transportation grouped fatalities by presumed cause and
presented these findings:4


31% (9,967) of total fatalities were caused by alcohol-impaired driving



10% (3,179) of total fatalities were caused by distracted driving



2.6% (846) of total fatalities were caused by drowsy drivers



28% (9,262) of total fatalities were caused by speeding-related crashes.

The image below shows historical trends in crash fatalities, fatality rates, injuries, and the
injury rate.

3
4

“National Statistics” FARS-NHTSA. See references.
“Traffic Safety Facts – Crash Stats.” US Dept. of Transportation – NHTSA. See References.
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This information accentuates an important piece of knowledge – approximately
72% of road accident fatalities occur primarily due to some form of human error, which
largely defines the current format of liability processes. In fact Chris Urmson, the director
of Google’s self-driving car program, reports that up to 94% of crashes are caused by
driver error5. Urmson also reports that in about six years of testing Google’s AVs on the
road, the test vehicles have been involved in eleven minor accidents that caused nothing
more than light vehicular damage; out of which the AV is said to have caused none of the
crashes. The drastic change suggests the immense use and utility that can be gained from
AVs, minimizing human error. Further, out of eleven accidents, eight incidents were rearending crashes – scenarios that will be reduced by highly sensitive technology built into
the AVs.
The information presented in this section makes a strong case for pushing past
decision making and programming hurdles to proceed with the production of AVs. The

5

Urmson, Chris. “The View from the Front Seat of the Google Self-Driving Car.”
7

margin by which AVs are expected to reduce road accidents and deaths emphasizes the
value of the vehicles, hence encouraging a rapid transition from human driven vehicles to
AVs, within the bounds of safety.

8

II.

Framework for Autonomy in Vehicles
The notion of autonomy is the most critical distinction between the current and

future state of vehicles; and it is the implications of this notion that create the need to
restructure the liability framework. Thus, it is necessary to analyze and understand
autonomy – what does it mean for a vehicle to be autonomous? The term ‘smart car’ has
increasingly found its way into our vocabulary, as it becomes a common prefix for more
capable technology – smartphone is the most common example, while the development
of other household machinery ushers in new terms such as smart fridge, smart tv etc.
Machine capability continues its rapid climb, with more intelligent devices and
appliances arriving annually. However, these machines are still not considered
autonomous. Perhaps then the presence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is needed for
autonomy – after all, it does allow machines to act independently, with minimal user
input. Common examples are bots such as Siri and Alexa. It is useful here to develop a
better understanding of what exactly AI is and how it serves a purpose in our discussion
of liability.
The most important aspect of AVs is the notion of autonomy – which, put in
simple terms, is enabling the machine at hand to become an independent decision-making
entity. In order to make decisions the machine must be programmed with some degree of
intelligence. Such a process of imparting knowledge on machinery falls in the realm of
artificial intelligence. The general worldwide view of artificial intelligence is skewed by
long-standing fantasy and hyperbole in the entertainment world, as well as speculation of
the danger of machine sentience. Hence, the definition this paper will consider is
9

somewhat broad: artificial intelligence is simply the notion of development of computer
systems to mimic certain human abilities, such as speech recognition, relevance
perception, analysis of data in the immediate environment, and learning for better
decision-making. Once again considering the example of Siri, although the bot appears
highly-intelligent, and bears some of the mentioned traits for AI functioning, it is still not
considered autonomous. Here, questions of the threshold between intelligence and
autonomy are provoked. These characteristics of vehicles must be defined to better
understand the capabilities of AVs.
The term “intelligence” tends to be broad, referring to varying levels of
development. The word itself is a semantic placeholder for any entity with comparatively
higher capabilities. To streamline the discussion, we resort to the following definition,
“Intelligence is the ability to formulate one or more action sequences which can increase
the probability of successfully achieving the system’s goals in an uncertain environment.”
(Gunderson, Gunderson 141). Let’s apply this definition to a set of vehicles which we’ll
call intelligent vehicles (IVs). The system here is the IV’s AI computer, and its goal is to
evade accidents, or to cause the minimum damage in an inevitable accident. An IV will
survey the situation at hand and study it to develop a list of courses of action, but leaves it
to the driver to select the preferred course. Although the IV conducts cognitive activity,
there is no resulting path of execution determined by the technology within the IV itself.
This unrestricted ability for execution would allow an IV to be considered an AV.

In order to execute a course of action, the AV must be able to compare possible
courses and determine the best outcome. Determination of the outcome is based on the
10

core values programmed into the AI system. Similar to the human process of selecting
courses of action based on a set of inherent rules and morals, the vehicle must be given an
ethical guideline by which to make to decisions. The need for a guideline introduces a
key concept – machine ethics – which grapples with the ethical dilemmas of
programming such human traits into computer systems. For a greater understanding of
the importance of machine ethics in any conversation on artificial intelligence, Tonkens
provides some clarity:

The nascent field of Machine Ethics is gaining momentum. Much of its fuel
stems from the perceived imminent and inevitable (Allen et al. 2006, p. 13;
See also Sparrow 2007, p. 64) development of artificial moral agents
(hereafter AMAs), who will be able to (or already do) perform morally
consequential actions in the world. Because autonomous machines will
perform ethically relevant actions, akin to humans, prudence dictates that we
design them to act morally.

(Tonkens 2)

Although Tonkens terminology of artificial moral agents is not followed throughout this
study, it provokes discussion of the standard required for any ideas and concerns to be
considered as part of the machine ethics concept. Discussions of machine ethics are
intended to assess the acceptability of autonomous machinery in real-world situations; or
in other terms , “machine ethics is concerned with the behavior of machines towards
human users and other machines.” (Anderson, Anderson 1). AVs simply taking action
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that results in positive ethical outcomes is not considered to come under machine ethics,
which focuses on the inherent code of ethics upon which the vehicle exercises its
autonomy. Looking at an example: robot jockeys can replace young enslaved boys in
camel races in Qatar, freeing them from slavery6. Although this may seem an ethical act
by granting the young jockeys freedom, it does not require the programming of an ethical
framework into the machinery, and hence is not considered to fall under machine ethics.
With this notion of a code of ethics we can analyze autonomy and how it’s exercised.

Humans and a number of other members of the animal kingdom are granted an
autonomous status due to the attribute of self-governance. Since the discussion of liability
adds a tinge of morality to ideals of autonomy, we can further explore self-governance
through a Kantian lens. Kant argues that this notion of moral self-governance requires an
adherence to one’s own self-imposed rules, rather than an obedience to any set of
externally imposed rules. It remains true, however, that individuals may willfully abide
by external principles without detriment to their autonomy. Although tethered to this
moral anchor, humans individually interact with these morals under their own selfimposed set of rules.

While autonomy in humans seems to be guided by a code of ethics and laws, it
does not bear the exact same meaning as autonomy in the case of AVs. The degree of
autonomy programmed into the vehicle must achieve desirable outcomes, such as
meeting the standard of social acceptability – maximizing benefits while limiting risks.

6

Example taken from Anderson, Anderson; provided by James Moor, symposium keynote
speaker.
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The vehicle’s autonomy is rooted in the program and code of ethics written by the
manufacturer, which provokes the question of what code of ethics do we use? Surely
ethical principles are not collectively consistent within the population of a township,
much less so with the entire nation’s citizen body.

The ethics programmed into the vehicle is reliant on the code of ethics that
manufacturers believe to be apt, which is likely to be an extension of a set of morals that
add to the market value of AVs. Given the subjectivity in individuals’ ethical virtues, it is
possible that ethical flaws can be found in any outcome that directly results from the
vehicle’s ethics. Programming the vehicle to save passengers, to sacrifice passengers, or
to cause any property or bodily damage involves a moral decision that could be
challenged by different ethical perspectives. Due to the severity of societal consequences
that come with poor AV decision making, it is imperative that the code of ethics of the
vehicle meets some acceptable social standard. We can refer to this standard as a social
good or a social optimum. Reaching optimality entails accessing the full benefits of AVs,
which in turn brings minimal risk. If a specific ethical framework more effectively
prevents accidents, the overall risk of using the road is reduced; thus it is likely to be
socially acceptable. Socially acceptability is the standard that must be strived for, as it is
an indicator of optimality. It is likely that this set of principles will be declared as
ubiquitous moral maxims to be programmed into AVs.

Given a liberty to self-govern comparable to that of humans, vehicles can ascend
into autonomy. An IV and AV share systemic goals and both rapidly produce solutions,
but AVs progress a step further by sifting through solutions to find the optimal option,
13

and executing the best course of action. “Autonomy is the capability of systems to select
between multiple possible action sequences to achieve the system’s goals, based on the
current situation and internally defined criteria.” (Gunderson Gunderson 141). The term
‘internally defined criteria used in this definition alludes to the functioning of the AI
system; specifically focusing on the moral and decision-making framework programmed
into the vehicle.
The ultimate course of action chosen by the vehicle’s AI is based on the set of
rules given to the system. Decision making is a necessity for vehicle autonomy, and it is
important for manufacturers to consider a decision making framework that attempts to
achieve the system’s goals so that greater societal goals can be met. Achieving these
goals requires AVs to be in constant coordination, that is – the vehicles must agree on
intended courses of action and be able to communicate and analyze information on the
next planned movement to ensure safe transition. The necessary coordination of AVs
suggests that the moral framework – which guides decision making – programmed into
the vehicle has to be one that contains some universal aspect that enables AVs to work in
unison.

This objective framework is the only external set of rules imposed. The vehicle
maintains its ability to self-govern; the only alteration being that its decision making
process is rooted in an external framework. The vehicle does not have to go outside its
own AI system to analyze and execute courses of action.

14

In order for this autonomy to be enabled the vehicle must have the ability to
accept input data from the environment around it. Humans exercise autonomy based on
sensory input, and similarly manufacturers must build such capabilities into AVs. Due to
the magnitude of the risks that come with vehicle use, sensors on AVs should provide indepth information, beyond just motion and distance sensing. The AV sensors must
collectively provide enough data to determine the number of obstacles on the path (as
well as those on alternate paths), and differentiate between types of obstacles, among
other capabilities. The AV needs maximal information to select and execute the best
possible outcome.

With this established understanding of vehicle autonomy and its requirements we
can move forward to discussing the benefits of AV autonomy. The most significant
advantage that comes with autonomous capability in vehicles is the elimination of
complete driver control. The state of the driver is uncertain and unpredictable; as
erroneous behavior can be induced in people by a plethora of factors. The introduction of
autonomous capability allows the vehicle to evade the risks tethered to human error, and
in turn significantly reduce the overall risks of commuting by road.

Another benefit that comes with vehicle autonomy is the additional utility
afforded to users by foregoing the need for active user control of the vehicle. Without the
need to dedicate complete focus to road and traffic conditions, the AV user can make
better use of the time spent commuting. Users avoid the fatigue of driving, furthering the
potential for productivity. Additionally, autonomous vehicles unlock a new consumer
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base, providing individuals with an inability to drive with access to self-sufficient
transport.

Equipping a vehicle with an autonomous system will however bring an inherent
set of risks. AV users have to trust the system in all decision-making situations, which
involves acceptance of the risk of the vehicle making a wrong decision. It seems rational
to be more averse to enabling autonomy if it brings more risk. The potential
consequences of making a wrong decision are so severe that it raises questions of whether
risking the uncertainty of autonomous decision making is worthwhile. To justify taking
such risk, the impact of AVs on the level of road safety must be reemphasized. The
capabilities of AVs are set to reduce road accident and death by a substantial margin,
which suggests that enabling the autonomous capabilities of vehicles reduces the overall
risk of road travel. This is to say that although AVs have some small probability of
making the wrong decision, the vehicles have to run the risk of making that decision on
fewer occasions. The superior level of road safety brought about by enabling vehicle
autonomy limits and outweighs the risks that come with decision making errors,
justifying granting vehicles the relevant autonomous capabilities.

To produce the greatest potential benefit from AVs, manufacturers have the
important task of molding the vehicle’s autonomy to more effectively avoid risks. This
threshold of autonomy should allow the vehicle to maintain decision-making capabilities,
but limit the potential courses of action to the most rational and acceptable outcomes. The
vehicle’s autonomy must be constrained by the appropriate set of road, transport and
vehicle laws that push for an optimal social outcome. Additionally, the vehicle’s
16

decision-making system must not produce outcomes outside of predominant moral
standards. It is imperative that the vehicle’s autonomy remains rooted in the framework
programmed in by the manufacturer, to prevent the decision-making from being
influenced by individuals’ moral standards. AV users should not have the ability to alter
the vehicle’s autonomy to serve personal purposes, as it can impact coordination by
causing incoherence in communication. The system shouldn’t be able to find and exploit
loopholes in the existing legal structure. Further, consideration of liability will be
impacted by the capabilities of the vehicle and the foundational factors involved in its
decision-making.

Ensuring the optimal decision-making by AVs facilitates the replacement of
human drivers, creating an environment with less risk. However, despite the
improvement in general safety, there remains some probability that AVs will encounter
an accident. The potential for an accident, however small, indicates that over time a nonnegligible number of accidents is likely to occur. The occurrence of accidents ushers in
questions of liability. Damages caused by accidents must be accounted for, provoking
further considerations of how and to whom liability is distributed. The framework for
assigning liability must account for a number of considerations. The process involves a
reallocation of individuals’ property based on the circumstances surrounding the accident
in question; thus accounting for a purely objective tally of fatalities and damages is
incoherent with this ideal. Additionally, to fully achieve the benefits of AVs, we must
avoid any obstacles to the production of, or demand for the vehicles. Another
consideration is of justice – liability must maintain fairness and uphold acceptable moral

17

standards.
So why not just fall back on insurance and liability processes that are ubiquitously
followed today? The following section will present and analyze the currently prevalent
model of liability to determine its feasibility in an autonomous world, using its principles
to fill gaps in other possible frameworks.

18

III. Solutions
The Purpose of Liability
Thus far we have made some mention of liability and the need of a novel, reworked system for its assignment; but before analyzing such potential frameworks an
overlooked question must be addressed – what is the purpose of a system to assign
liability? Understanding the purpose of liability provides an ideal towards which all
participants in the AV realm must strive to achieve. It is the basis upon which we guide
our thinking and frame potential liability models.

Liability systems aim to preserve a generally acceptable moral standard of road
sharing, that is upheld by enforcing a level of moral responsibility on all parties. This
aspect of liability allows for progression toward the optimal social good by targeting
manufacturers and drivers as agents, exacting a cost on both finances and conscience to
improve future decision-making and the resulting actions. Liability channels agency in a
manner that is coherent with societal benefit and incentivizes progressive betterment of
accident preventive behaviors or processes.

Let us first consider the implications of a liability free system. Subtracting the
threat of liability eliminates accountability7 for actions. This elimination occurs not only
for drivers, but also for all parties that could be involved in an accident – including
pedestrians and even the manufacturers. Without any accountability, we are left with no

7

This accountability will be primarily financial and legal.
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way of regulating behavior, which could allow drivers and manufacturers to act purely
with self-concern, as there is no consequence for doing so. To put in another manner, the
absence of liability leaves no incentive to further the social good if it conflicts with
personal goals. Although achieving the desired level of social good will provide universal
benefits – such as a lower probability of road accidents – individuals may still choose to
forego these benefits for more immediate and direct advantages; and must be encouraged
to prioritize social concerns.

It is valuable to justify our assumption that agents will indeed succumb and act
according to self-interest. Observing everyday driving practices, we can rationally derive
some degree of self-interest over social concern. Consider speeding on highways as an
example. Given an uncongested highway, numerous vehicles on the road tend to travel at
speeds over the legal and safe limit. Drivers speed in order to more efficiently achieve
their goals, by arriving at their destination faster. In addition, the relative risk of speeding
is low, as fines are of low-cost. If the liability costs of all vehicle behavior is lowered to a
similar extent, it is likely that drivers would more greatly risk road safety to achieve
personal goals. To better clarify this argument we need a macro-level example – hence
we will consider the traffic patterns in India.

Traffic in India is notorious for its unruliness and erratic flow. Although the state
of Indian traffic laws is on the rise, there has historically been improper enforcement of
the laws, as well as an absence of some necessary rules – lane discipline in particular.
Due to the lacking enforcement, drivers are more willing to take risks under the belief
that they are likely to escape any liability; a willingness that translates to daily driving
20

behavior. There exist scenarios in which drivers will operate their vehicles under the
influence of alcohol, knowing the immense risks and safety hazards, because of the same
belief of avoiding liability. The impact of lacking lane discipline laws is most prominent
in traffic patterns, as rarely is lane discipline observed. Given the absence of the threat of
liability, drivers shift freely and unpredictably between lanes to expedite their commute.
In the event of an accident, drivers often do not resort to official means, and choose to
negotiate privately.

The possibility of private negotiation is another obstacle to achieving the purpose
of liability. If people do drive recklessly, without a system of liability we may not know
of it. People may settle disputes privately, or just drive away from an accident since there
is no burden of liability. The problem with this is that in the case of AV accidents,
information will not be relayed back to manufacturers – information that is needed to
improve the AV’s functioning. If we do not know what is going on, we can’t hold
manufacturers to standards of development, as they won’t know all the details of what
went wrong. It is possible that AV users too will have less incentive to act according to
guidelines over self-interest in a number of scenarios. Liability systems must be put in
place to curtail the self-prioritization of all parties that could be involved in an accident.

Viewing liability as a form of sentencing allows us to break down and analyze
liability through the lens of Hallevy8. The purpose of any form of sentencing could
follow under the following areas: retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, and

8

In When Robots Kill, Gabriel Hallevy studies and analyzes criminal sentencing of AI entities,
ultimately arguing for theories of application of these sentences to corporations, specifically those
behind the AI entities in question.
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rehabilitation. Retribution is a notion that does not fit the motives of auto accident
liability. The basis for retribution is a form of negative reinforcement, exacting some
suffering on the perpetrator, to pacify society by counteracting the damage caused.
Liability under retribution will serve as a retaliation to the offense committed, ignoring
any effect of consequential action on the social benefit. AVs generally lack the cognitive
processes that enable suffering to influence humans, thus applying such punishment to
the vehicles is futile. Since retribution is achieved only through suffering and no other
means, it cannot be applied to AVs; hence we take the notion no further.

Incapacitation involves physical measures to ensure that the violation is not
committed again, and is present in more extreme cases of accident liability. Such
inhibition for humans could include financial constraints, withdrawing of driving
privileges, or even forms of physical confinement like house arrest and imprisonment.
Although such methods are effective for humans, it seems impractical to attempt to
inhibit AVs in the same manner. We can however go a step further and apply forms of
incapacitation to the manufacturers, as AV agency is an extension of the manufacturer’s.
This corporate imprisonment model will be discussed later under manufacturer liability.

Deterrence and Rehabilitation seem to be the central concerns for any sentencing
system – including auto accident liability. The threat of liability costs should be sufficient
to discourage and prevent actions that may cause accidents in the future, while also
motivate a change in the mindset of the liable party in the accident. Deterrence
encapsulates the first half of the previous sentence, pushing for a means of discouraging
future violations. It takes a two-pronged course of action: (a) deterring the agent
22

committing the action (b) deterring others from committing the action. Although the
liable agent faces the greatest impediment to committing future violations, others are
averse to being in the position of the liable agent; and are indirectly discouraged from
committing punishable activity.

Rehabilitation goes a step further in attempting to change the mindset of
perpetrators. The notion of rehabilitation is applied in a number of present day scenarios,
with both physical and mental concentrations. Taking alcohol as an example, the purpose
of rehabilitation is to develop an inherent aversion to alcohol within the user. Similarly,
the ideal liability system must foster a mindset that is averse to further violating any
laws. With an established understanding of the purpose of liability we can analyze and
compare different frameworks to paint a picture of what accident liability could look like.

Current Framework
Any discussion of potential frameworks must consider the presently predominant
model. Our analysis of possible solutions must first ask the question of whether there
exists a need for a novel solution, if a feasible and functional framework is already in
place. In order to appropriately respond to this question, we must first look at the
adequacy of the current system for assigning liability to determine the need for any
efforts put into creating a fresh framework.

The current and long-standing framework of auto-accident liability is one that
emphasizes the causal network around the accident. Stating this in a simplified manner,
we need to know what events or behaviors actually caused the accident. Liability follows
23

the causal link, ultimately being pushed onto the individual(s) that committed the relevant
actions and errors. The process of following a causal chain most commonly results in an
assessment of driver fault as the principal determinant of liability assignment. The
justification here is that the driver of a vehicle has committed some moral flaw if his own
negligent actions lead to the harm of others, or the damage of property. There is however
a twist in the currently employed model – the causal chain may not necessarily link back
to just a single party. Taking an example, a driver A may have been startled by negligent
actions of another driver B, or by an illegal maneuver by a bicyclist or pedestrian. Under
such circumstances, the entire burden of fault is not borne by driver A; and can be
additionally divided between driver B and the cyclist as well. Tangible versions of this
example are presented in the form of case law later in this section.

It will be useful to delve into the notion of fault under this framework, as better
understanding of how fault is determined will paint a clear picture of the process of
liability assignment. Common law segregates fault into three primary subsections:
negligence, recklessness, and intentional misconduct9. Although these terms are further
broken down for legal specificity, a broader understanding is considered for the purposes
of this paper. Negligence is commonly seen in cases of driver fault, and is simply
carelessness while operating vehicles. All operators of motor vehicles are required to
exercise a certain degree of care that will minimize any predictable risks and afford
maximum protection to other patrons of the road and immediately surrounding
environments. Negligence can occur in both active and passive forms: an example of the

9

“Fault and Liability for Motor Vehicle Accidents.” FindLaw. See References.
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former being something such as not yielding the right of way or running a red light, and
the latter something such as not noticing a red light or another vehicle in the blind spot
due to distracted driving. While negligence can be a passive act, recklessness is defined
as a “willful disregard for the safety and welfare of others.”10 An action is considered to
be reckless behavior if the driver has an understanding of the possible damage and harm
that may occur from the action, but makes the decision to commit the action regardless of
the presented concerns. Examples of reckless behavior include driving under the
influence of alcohol, or other sensory impairing substances, and driving well above the
known speed limit. The active understanding of the risks that come with the committed
actions merits greater liability being placed on the driver than in cases of negligence.

The third subsection, intentional misconduct, goes one step further. An act is
considered to be intentional misconduct if the driver not only understands the risks that
come with committing an action, but pursues the commitment of that action with the
intent of actualizing the potential risks and harm. This type of fault is rooted in the
mindset of the driver; and an example of this could be a premeditated hit-and-run.
Intuitively, the burden of liability that falls on the driver will be the greatest amongst the
three subsections under fault.

With this established understanding of the current framework of liability
assignment, we can begin to determine its worth in the autonomous realm. Can we simply
adopt the same framework in essence? Let us start by considering the dominant theme of
driver fault within the system. For better analysis, the notion of driver fault should be
10

Ibid.
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tweaked just slightly, being understood as human fault – determined by human error.
Although human error will remain somewhat of a concern, its significance will greatly
diminish as AVs intend to minimize such error; and hence we can assume that a higher
number of accidents will occur as a result of issues outside of human shortcomings. In
light of this challenge, the assignment of fault becomes complicated due to a now
obstructed causal link.

It is interesting to note, however, that despite such a crippling challenge to the
current framework, themes of negligence, recklessness and intentional misconduct can
contribute in a similar manner to whichever new framework is implemented. To better
understand this implementation under new systems, we can hypothesize applications to
cases in which the driver seems not to be at fault. In such situations, fault based models
can be applied to other parties surrounding and involved in the accident in a similar
manner to the driver. The process includes assessing the causal connection of any other
parties or participants in the accident to the incident itself, and determining liability by
levels of negligence, recklessness, or intent. Liability is assigned to the party determined
to be the primary violator, or can be split among liable parties depending on their
respective degree of fault.

The current framework of fault based liability can be better understood by
considering examples – specifically, studying relevant case law. Hartley v. State11, which
came to a close in 1985, set a precedent for determining driver negligence and the

11

Filed as a case against the state for negligently granting Johnson a driving license, but the direct causal
link between Johnson’s actions and the accident absolved the State of any liability.
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subsequent liability attached. The case has over two thousand citing references, being
invoked in 477 other cases. The outcome of Hartley v. State displayed a system that
would assign liability, increasing the magnitude of consequences for repeat offenders.
The background of the case is as follows, “Janet Hartley was killed when an automobile
driven by Eugene R. Johnson crossed the center line and collided with her auto February
6, 1980, on a highway between Tacoma and Puyallup. Johnson was intoxicated at the
time of the collision and was charged with negligent homicide.”12 The challenge facing
the liability system in this case is determining the direction in which liability should
move, as well as magnitude of the assigned liability. Although Johnson accepted liability
costs with his guilty plea, there was little question of assigning liability elsewhere. He
acted negligently by operating the vehicle while intoxicated and supplementary
background information on Johnson showed a pattern of reckless behavior. Due to this
background and the direct causal link between Johnson’s actions and the damage caused,
he was declared entirely liable for the accident.
A more recent case, Kazan v. Kennedy, which was decided in 2016, focuses on an
accident with slightly different circumstances – involving a vehicle and a pedestrian. The
case sites Hartley v. State, following its precedent. This case provides a view into an
example of how the legal liability process unfolds in accident scenarios that don’t involve
just a single or multiple motorists. Kazan v. Kennedy displays the universality of the
fault-based liability model, as it considers the causal connection to all patrons of the road
and its fringes. The background of the case is as follows, “On the afternoon of July 23,

12

Hartley v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 768, 770, 698 P.2d 77, 79 (1985)
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2015, Plaintiff Samer Kazan, an Amazon employee, was walking south on Westlake
Avenue in Seattle from one building in which he worked to another. Decl. of Cochran,
Exh. 1 (“Kazan Depo”) at 122:24-123:10, 178:9-10. Defendant Walter Kennedy (d/b/a
Oncore Coach Leasing) was driving his bus north on Westlake Avenue. According to
Plaintiff, the traffic light at the intersection of Westlake Avenue and Thomas Street
showed a white “Walk” signal. Plaintiff testified that he entered the crosswalk and was
struck by the bus driven by Defendant, who was turning left from Westlake onto
Thomas.”13 Some witnesses corroborated the plaintiff’s story, but only one did so with
sufficient accuracy. While the witness account contributed to the verdict, the driver was
declared to be negligently operating his vehicle for not noticing, and consequently
yielding right of way to the pedestrian. Violation of the laws regarding right of way
enabled the burden of liability to fall solely on the bus driver.

Although both examples represent driver liability, the precedent of causal
connection between negligence and damage caused suggests that fault-based liability
could have similarly found the pedestrian in Kazan v. Kennedy guilty and liable. It
happened to be the case that the driver appeared to be more negligent than the pedestrian
– who is declared free of claims of negligence, due to the light signaling that he had
undisputed right of way. If instead the pedestrian had been distracted and stepped onto
the crossing without noticing the light change to red, he would be considered the more
negligent, and hence liable party. From these cases it seems that a similar process of
judgement can be applied to a number of scenarios, as the purpose of liability is adhered

13

Kazan v. Kennedy, No. C15-1251-BJR, 2016 WL 6084934, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 18, 2016)
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to. From both cases it is clear that the guilty party was deemed as such due to violating
laws and norms put in place to preserve a socially optimal state. Obstruction of the social
optimum can be considered a moral flaw as it reduces the overall safety of road travel,
increasing the risk for other vehicle users and pedestrians. The liability system applied in
both cases condemns violations, discouraging future repetition.

The following sections discuss how fault based liability can still play a role in a
new process of liability assignment – channeling our focus to forms of driver and
manufacturer liability. The hypothesis here is that the current framework cannot cater to
an AV world by itself, but aspects of it may still remain key to other models. The
following sections will test this hypothesis.

Driver Liability
We begin our exploration of alternatives that we can acceptably employ.
Although holding the manufacturer responsible seems the obvious second option, we will
discuss other models before returning to it. A good starting point for our analysis would
be the consideration of driver-directed liability. An adequate study of this type of liability
requires answering questions of the moral permissibility of such a course of action; after
all, a benefit of having an autonomous mode of transport is to allow more passenger
independence by eliminating the need for constant control over the vehicle. The difficulty
here comes in attempting to assign liability to drivers similar to the system for nonautonomous vehicles. Given the minimized degree of active driver intervention needed
for AVs, the causal and agential link to driver actions is absent. Should methods of

29

liability assignment differ if the driver has some opportunity for intervention; as opposed
to none whatsoever? The analysis will follow the framework of Hevelke and Rumelin,
dichotomizing driver liability into a ‘duty to intervene’ and ‘strict liability’ models. The
former requires the driver to focus on road conditions enabling intervention when
necessary; assigning liability to the driver in the event of failure to intervene. The latter
model takes away both the duty and ability for intervention, but keeps in place the moral
and legal responsibility for the accident, which can be construed as a supplemented
financial responsibility.
Delving into the ‘duty to intervene’ model, it is apparent that the driver must pay
continuous attention to the road, while also actively searching for risk and ultimately
making decisions that appropriately address the risk at hand. Such requirements for the
driver seem to match the basic criteria for vehicle operation that drivers currently faced
with. Complete focus is presently a necessity due to the rate and potential of road
accidents. Despite the imminence of road accidents, national statistics show that “at any
given daylight moment across America, approximately 660,000 drivers are using cell
phones or manipulating electronic devices while driving.”14 With the projected drastic
decline in accident, fatality, and injury rates, it seems unlikely that an idle driver in an
AV will exercise complete focus on the road and attempt to identify accidents that occur
with significantly less probability.

14

“Facts and Statistics.” Distraction.Gov
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The next question to answer is that of the driver’s ability to predict potential accidents
and intervene effectively. In fact, driver intervention could lead to less desirable
outcomes than the vehicle's decision-making. Hevelke and Rumelin state:
“Accidents are usually not easily foreseeable—especially if there is no driver that
might be noticeably tired, angry or distracted. Therefore, it will probably be difficult
to recognize dangerous situations which the autonomous vehicle might be ill
equipped to manage, and even harder to intervene in time. Of course, much will
depend on what kind of cases we are talking about. If the problem in which the driver
must intervene tend to be foreseeable (if there is, for example, some sort of timely
warning sign given by the vehicle), this is not a problem. But once we are talking
about fully autonomous cars which drive as safely as the average person, such a
predictability of dangerous situations seems unlikely and unrealistic. Moreover,
accidents could not only happen because persons fail to override the system when
they should have, but also because people override it when there really was no
danger of the system causing an accident (Douma and Palodichuk 2012). As the
level of sophistication of autonomous cars improves, the possibility of interventions
by the driver might cause more accidents than it helps to avoid.” (Hevelke, Rumelin
624)

Driver effectiveness is a significant uncertainty with dangerous potential, and seems to
have a direct correlation with the likelihood of the occurrence of accidents. We have
already established that the probability of accidents plummets with the introduction of
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AVs. Since the likelihood of accidents is set to reduce in an AV world, it seems as though
driver effectiveness will move in the same direction.

An additional concern that arises with a duty to intervene model considers the
value of the AVs with regard to the added utility of such vehicles as compared to the
current vehicles we are accustomed to. The concern of vehicle utility is as follows – a
duty to intervene will eliminate the entire section of marginal vehicle users that AVs will
gain access to. Marginal users include any individuals with an inability to drive.
Adopting such a framework will negate the capability of independent vehicle operation
granted by AVs by making it illegal for anyone without that very capability to use their
vehicles. People with disabilities, and the elderly will be unable to enjoy the autonomy of
the vehicles; and features that enable the vehicle to drive the owner home when drunk, or
independently park itself will be rendered obsolete.

Presented with the combination of concerns of driver effectiveness and the
lacking utility provided by this model, we are likely to see less enthusiasm from
consumers of AVs. Potential AV users factor in the benefits of AVs into their choice to
purchase such a vehicle – finding the time-saving ability to be less attentive, and the
independence of self-sufficient transport greatly appealing. Additionally, it seems as
though a Duty to Intervene model would be largely unacceptable to potential users of
AVs, signaling the probable decline in consumer demand for the vehicles under such
circumstances.
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The ‘strict liability’ model pushes the burden of liability on the driver regardless
of the inability to influence a potential accident situation. Even if the driver has no
possible way of intervening, he takes on moral responsibility by understanding the risks
that come with operating an AV. Although AVs are poised to significantly reduce road
accidents, such events – and any associated risks – will continue to occur. The use of
AVs will also continue to create risk for others, such as other vehicle operators,
pedestrians, and even other passengers within the AV. Although blame cannot be
assigned as a direct result of driver action, participation in the risky action of operating an
AV, given the potential external costs, merits some burden of liability falling on the
driver. The responsibility of risk is to be similarly assumed by all operators of AVs
nationwide, a notion which dissects the strict liability model into two possible methods of
implementation: (a) the current notions of strict liability in use (b) liability limited to risks
associated with operating the AV.

The notion of strict liability is present very much present today, however is not
invoked in the realm of auto accident liability. Strict liability can be seen in its
application to pet ownership. Any pet owner assumes complete liability for damages
caused by their pet, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the damage. For
example, let’s take a person A who is in ownership of a dog who we’ll call Buddy.
Buddy is an obedient and friendly dog with no history of ferocity. Regardless of this
background, if Buddy does cause harm to someone, person A is the liable party; even in
the event that Buddy was provoked and simply defending himself. Similarly, we can
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apply this framework to the ownership of AVs. The AV acts as a substitute for Buddy the
dog, and liability will continue to fall on the owner, person A.

Even if no direct causal link to the driver can be made, liability must still be
assigned, and may be levied as the overall cost of damages that resulted from the
accident. It is likely that a majority of AV accidents will happen without driver cause,
despite which drivers will need to bear the responsibility for any damage caused by their
AVs. Avoiding liability becomes more a matter of probability and luck in such a
situation.

The second method of implementation under the strict liability model accounts for
the risks of AV operation as a collective, emphasizing the responsibilities to be
undertaken daily by any user of an AV. The risks that come with AV use similarly affect
every individual user, which suggests that the costs of the given risks must also be shared
in a similar manner. A possible method of assigning liability costs involves observing
liability at a macro level – collectively considering the parallel responsibilities of the
entire AV ownership community. Despite freedom from direct causal blame, the potential
risks and external costs tethered to using an AV can be assessed and immediately
addressed preemptively by the institution of a mandatory ‘AV tax’. This is to say that in
the event of accidents, AV drivers would have to bear no further liability costs as this
burden would have been lifted prior. The tax enables AV drivers to atone for any
potential risk, regardless of levels of negligence and causal relation in future accidents.
The tax ensures that AV drivers maintain and account for their share of liability in all
possible conditions.
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Achieving strict liability in this manner requires in depth analysis of the various
subparts that form the final product. Creating a mandatory AV tax comes with the
convoluted task of determining the collective risks of the AV population, and further,
arriving at a tax figure to levy on AV operators that will not discourage consumers from
purchasing the vehicles. While the calculation of such a figure is well within the
capability of federal powers, objections may arise during the process of distributing the
costs. The structuring of the tax must be considered carefully to avoid inequities to the
greatest extent possible – it is possible that numerous AV users will be paying costs that
are surplus to their road safety patterns, and thus are contributing in excess of the just and
equitable amount assigned by societal factors. On the flipside, a number of AV users are
likely to contribute less than their fair share to the societal costs.

Further, strict liability models seem to have some moral flaws; as it can unjustly
distribute punishment. The Kazan v. Kennedy case can be modified to provide an
example – substituting the bus driver with an AV user. Suppose in this scenario that the
walkway signal had turned red, but the pedestrian, distracted on his cell phone, entered
the walkway unaware. The AV user making the turn had the right of way, but the vehicle
collides with the crossing pedestrian. Even if the AV user was exerting the utmost care,
and the vehicle was operating as per programming and guidelines, the AV user is the
liable party. It appears in this case that it would be morally wrong to implicate the AV
user in lieu of the pedestrian. The assigning of liability to the AV user could conflict with
ideas introduced in the section discussing the purpose of liability.
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An aspect of the purpose of liability encourages moral improvement to preserve
an acceptable level of morality that is required to prevent and minimize accidents. By
assigning liability without fault and causation, we are hindering the ability of individuals
to exercise their rights by punishing15 them for liability, despite an inability to avoid it. It
appears that in our pursuit of an ideal social level of morality, we are committing moral
violations. “Any form of strict liability that permits criminal conviction of defendants that
lack moral fault is unacceptable (Simester 21, Gardner 69–70, Husak 91, Duff 128). The
moral framework that supports this claim is rights-based (Simester 34), relying on the
connected thoughts that criminal conviction leads to punishment, punishment must be
deserved, desert implies wrongdoing, and wrongdoing presupposes fault.”16 Although
there is a mention of criminal conviction, the argument can extend to any methods that
impose a restraint on human autonomy and rights. Punishment for criminal convictions
could take the form of monetary fines, forfeiture of property, imprisonment and death,
among others. These forms of punishment place a constraint on the offender’s freedom
either by limiting resources or physically limiting the ability to act in a manner of choice.
Similarly, the consequences (whether they be fines, community service, imprisonment
etc.) of being involved in an accident are applied as a constraint on the AV user. Strict
liability forces AV users to accept constraints on their autonomy and rights even if they
acted perfectly in accordance with guidelines.

15

We can speculate that punishment is likely to be a financial burden; perhaps along with some
penalty on driving credibility similar to the three strike license system today. It is possible that
imprisonment may serve as an option, but seems improbable given the forced nature of strict
liability.
16
Shiner, R.A. & Hoemsen, J. Criminal Law, Philosophy (2007) 1: 119. doi:10.1007/s11572-0069007-9
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The expectation is that AVs will be manufactured with operational thresholds that
match consumer demand, while also maximally diminishing risk. Individuals will likely
refuse payment for any potential AV accident in the taxed region due to the subjectivity
and difficulty in accurately quantifying the potential dangers of operating an AV. It
seems as though this model of driver liability will also be deemed socially unacceptable.

Additionally, some manufacturers (Mercedes, Volvo, and Google as of now) have
publicly announced their intention to bear the complete burden of liability, should their
vehicles be involved in any accident. Drivers of these vehicles will no longer be held
liable, thus this decision by manufactures is likely to push us away from models of driver
liability17.
We are now left with the analysis of this manufacturer based model of liability –
one in which all manufacturers bear the full burden of accident liability. The section
below discusses the possibilities that come with such a process, as well as different cases
in which liability processes will have to be varyingly applied.

Manufacturer Liability
The previous section effectively rules out models of driver liability, leaving us
with another unexplored option – if we can’t assign liability to the people involved focus
must shift to the other victim of any accident – the vehicle. Such personification of the

17

There remains a possibility of driver liability maintain relevance – in the event that not all AV
manufacturers follow this trend. If some manufacturers choose not to take on liability we are once again
faced with a discussion of how to assign liability: should driver liability models be applied to for these AVs,
or should we force manufacturer liability on all manufacturers?
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machine may seem striking, but holds significant weight and relevance in the discussion
to follow. The functioning of the AV involves the mimicking of certain human traits and
behaviors – specifically the assessment and addressing of imminent risks. Despite having
an immensely higher threshold for error as compared to humans, the vehicles don’t
escape the set of external costs that come with their operation. Given the prospect of
damage (regardless of an overall decrease in potential damages), an important question
arises: should the burden of liability be assigned based on shortcomings of the vehicles?
After all the vehicle is the principal decision-maker. AVs independently observe,
calculate, assess, and determine methods of addressing on-road risk; ultimately carrying
out the course of action that caused damage. There remains the chance that a human
driver would react to presented stimuli in a manner that results in less collateral damage,
hence further incriminating the flaws of the vehicle. It can at least be said with certainty
that the consumer will benefit from this system, being distanced from concerns of
liability.

Every purchaser and user of AVs will be acquiescent to this, as the burden of
liability is entirely lifted and passed on to the vehicle. It is important to keep in mind that
the rate of AV accidents is not being altered, thus maintaining the moral value of this
machine, and affording users the additional benefit of lower-risk commuting.

Assigning liability to the vehicle provokes the question of how the vehicle itself
can address this liability. We have followed a causal chain here that skipped past drivers
and has linked to the vehicle. Consideration of the purpose of liability needs to be
invoked in this situation. Based on our prior discussion of this purpose, it seems that we
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cannot achieve the aims of liability if it is applied solely to the vehicle; because despite
its autonomous decision making capabilities, an AV has no moral or fiscal agency that
independently incentivizes the vehicle to act in accordance with liability systems. Thus,
we have to trace the causal link further back to determine an adequate agent. The
decision-making capabilities of any AV are based on a set of moral guidelines provided
during the production process, thus indicating that any agency the vehicle has is an
extension of that of its manufacturer. Reapplying our thinking of the purpose of liability
to the agent – in this case the manufacturer – informs us that we have found a sufficient
target for liability.

Prior to delving into various forms of manufacturer liability, as well as
manufacturers’ mindset regarding liability adoption, it is helpful to discuss a base case –
situations in which the manufacturer can be indubitably held liable for accidents:
establishing a causal link to the manufacturer. This requires taking a step back to our
analysis of the current framework of liability assignment. Fault reemerges here as a
determinant of liability, once again using themes of negligence, recklessness, and
intentional misconduct as axes of assessment. Using such a model of fault liability
channels focus to any errors throughout the process of manufacture. The process can be
broadly divided into three subparts – vehicle design, production or marketing. Any errors
committed by people employed in these positions establishes the manufacturer’s
causality18. The identification of any flaws in these three areas that would increase the
probability of an accident justify liability being applied to the manufacturer. The

18

This will be the case unless an employee is acting under their own prerogative, outside of the
manufacturer’s extended agency. This notion is briefly mentioned further down.
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determination of the magnitude of the liability penalty will be determined on categorizing
flaws according to the tiers of fault. The definition and consequence of fault will be taken
from the existing federal guidelines – the construction of which is beyond the scope of
this paper. With this understanding of the condemnation of incriminating flaws during
manufacture we can consider possible examples.

Potential defects in the car can occur from flaws in the design process. Simple
flaws in vehicle design can have a detrimental impact in the event of an accident. For
example, the placing, as well as the number of sensors feeding the vehicle's decisionmaking system must be carefully analyzed. Further, design features may prevent the
vehicle from operating under certain circumstances – the aerodynamics of the vehicle
may disallow it from travelling beyond certain speeds, and certain factors may even
declare it dangerous to operate in specific climates or road conditions. Marketing the
vehicles in regions that exhibit conditions outside of the vehicle's operational capabilities
can constitute negligence on part of the manufacturer. Similarly, it is the responsibility to
provide and make evident and accessible any cautionary literature that informs users of
potential hazards. Any such feature of the vehicle that conflicts with optimal safety
measures can amount to manufacturer fault, assigning liability entirely to the
manufacturer, and impeding progress by damaging the manufacturer’s reputation and
financial well-being.

Manufacturers can also be causally linked to accidents through the code that
enables autonomy in the vehicles. We look back to the earlier discussion on the code of
ethics programmed into the vehicle. Since the vehicle’s agency is an extension of the
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manufacturer’s, it is imperative that the code of ethics implanted in the vehicle is morally
sound. Any moral shortcomings will render the manufacturer liable. Agency can be
further broken down to assign liability. It is possible that employees are acting under their
own agency, in which case the system is likely to hold the responsible individuals liable.
Liability will remain with the manufacturer if employees are acting as agents of their
employers.
Focusing on the latter – manufacturer liability – we continue to explore an ideal
framework. From a market standpoint, it is likely that consumers will understand the
benefits they stand to gain from manufacturer liability and flock to purchase AVs –
increasing the overall market demand. Although the demand for AVs will rise, it may be
met by a suffocating supply due to the heightened risks for manufacturers of AVs.
Manufacturers may be unable to accurately predict the number of accidents that occur;
and negative economic implications could come with a prediction that falls short of the
true cost. Any resulting constraints present a challenge to this simple version of
manufacturer liability that this paper will call the Hindrance problem. The substance of
the problem is that manufacturers will have less incentive to produce AVs due to the high
risk of liability and litigation costs.
“The technology is potentially doomed if there are a significant number of such
cases, because the liability burden on the manufacturer may be prohibitive of
further development. Thus, even though an autonomous vehicle may be safer
overall than a conventional vehicle, it will shift the responsibility for accidents,
and hence liability, from drivers to manufacturers. The shift will push the
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manufacturer away from the socially-optimal outcome—to develop the
autonomous vehicle” (Marchant and Lindor 1334)

An important notion presented in this passage is that of a socially optimal outcome.
Optimality seems to be tethered to the development of AVs – and the threat of liability
costs could discourage manufacturers from investing in further development of the
technology, or abandoning production altogether. Branching out from Marchant and
Lindor’s worry of abandoning production, we can speculate another possibility – that the
burden of liability will discourage manufacturers from pursuing socially optimal vehicle
behaviors in favor of behaviors that achieve outcomes with the lowest potential costs to
the manufacturer. Liability costs may be significant enough to damage the financial wellbeing of manufacturers, suggesting that in the event that liability costs cannot be
sufficiently reduced, manufacturers may decide to abandon the production of AVs
altogether. This outcome is socially undesirable, as it foregoes the numerous additional
lives that can be saved, and damage that can be prevented. The hindrance problem seems
to be a significant hurdle for this model of manufacturer liability, hence our new
framework must directly address this issue.

The solution needs to provide incentive to manufacturers to continue the
production of AVs, and simultaneously ensure that the purpose of liability is fulfilled.
However, not all methods that promote deterrence and rehabilitation will satisfy
manufacturers. An example of this is assigning a tax to all manufacturers in a similar
manner to the strict liability model under driver liability. While this achieves the purpose
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of liability, it does not address the hindrance problem. Perhaps incapacitation can add
value to this liability system.

In light of this notion of incapacitation, Hallevy lends us another hand here with
the introduction of his Corporate Imprisonment model for manufacturer liability. Let us
first consider the semantics of the term. Imprisonment can be understood simply as a
deprivation of liberty, in this case applied to corporations producing AVs. We can
immediately rule out certain forms of incapacitation such as imprisonment and sanctions
on the manufacturing process, as it will choke the production of AVs and impede our
social progress toward optimal social good. We now seek a different form of liberty
deprivation – one which works toward maintaining the market level – production and
development of AVs.

A possible method of solving this dilemma is the siphoning and sharing of
resources. The primary shortcoming of a tax penalty model was the diminished market
output of AVs, and the lacking incentive for manufacturers to maintain production to
standards. Instead of gathering the excess tax revenue, the taxed amount can be shared
with a competitor in the form of a subsidy. Viewing this transaction from an industrywide perspective, the changes balance out leaving the overall fiscal state of the industry
the same; although the capabilities of the manufacturers involved in the transaction are
altered.

Such a tax/subsidy model would not only incentivize liable manufacturers to
prevent future incidents; and to do so efficiently given the advantaged position of a
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competitor. The competitor that is rewarded with a subsidy must be determined by a
merit-based system to further incentivize competition. The features and functioning of
this system lays beyond the scope of our analysis.

The likely scenario for AV liability is one in which manufacturers agree to take
on the burden of accident liability. Although manufacturers may pass on some of the
liability costs to consumers through higher prices and servicing costs, the manufacturer
remains the directly liable agent. Accepting liability urges manufacturers to develop and
produce the optimal vehicle to better prevent accidents and the ensuing liability process.
It seems that such a model achieves the purpose of liability considering manufacturers,
but we must ensure that the same occurs with other agents. AV users may exploit the lack
of liability and behave in a reckless manner – taking action such as operating the vehicle
in unadvised conditions. The liability framework must act as a deterrent to users as well
as manufacturers. To prevent user abuse, the fault based aspects of the current framework
of liability can be invoked. Although manufacturers are responsible for the liability costs,
they can be granted an exemption if an accident is caused by user negligence or
recklessness.
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IV. Conclusion
As we move toward an autonomous world the need for user input diminishes,
signaling the need for expansion in our user-centric legislation. Transportation will be
based on the decision making of an AI system; thus the adopted liability framework must
take into account the extended capabilities of vehicles. The framework must also set a
precedent for accountability and discourage accident inducing behavior. The emphasis of
both the purpose of liability and the willingness to purchase or produce AVs is important,
as the framework must aim to jointly preserve both features.

Possible liability frameworks were assessed to determine the adherence to this
required balance. Considering both models of driver liability, it seems likely that
consumer willingness for AVs will decline. These models present moral flaws that a just
system must avoid. Additionally, the purpose of liability is not universally applied to all
parties, as manufacturers have the ability to exploit a system which places all liability on
vehicle users.

Similarly, models of manufacturer liability face the inverse problem of the
purpose of liability not being entirely fulfilled, as AV users have the potential to exploit
the lack of punishment. Manufacturers too would be more accepting of a framework that
understands potential liability concerns beyond the manufacturer's control that could
harm the resources needed for AV production and development. Manufacturer liability is

likely to become the instituted liability framework, but needs to address the potential
injustices it allows.

Although the current framework of liability assignment needs expansion, it
appears that the causal aspects of the model can fill the gaps in the other liability models
considered. Manufacturer liability is likely to become the dominant framework of
liability in an autonomous world; but in order for this framework to fit an ideal mold, it
must incorporate an analysis to determine fault. Causal links remain of immense
importance, and are a direct determinant of liability, which accentuates the value of
aspects of the current framework of liability.
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